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Abstracts
In order to analyze collusion stability in real economy 
under different cost structure, the fixed cost structure 
and variable cost structure is assumed under vertical 
differentiation and different competitive types (Cournot 
competition and Bertrand competition). By comparing 
the different competitive equilibrium, firm competes with 
each other under different cost structure and competitive 
types, which influences the stability of collusion in 
different ways. Under fixed cost and changeable cost 
structure, the high-quality firm is always more difficult 
to maintain collusion than the low-quality firm in vertical 
differentiation. With the increase of n , the quality 
difference will get smaller and smaller, the high-quality 
becomes more and more difficult to maintain collusion. 
In equilibrium, price competition is fiercer, firms aim to 
release price competition under Bertrand competition, and 
so the quality difference will be bigger.
Key words: Vertical differentiation; Competition 
Type; The stability of collusion
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INTRODUCTION 
Collusion can adopt kinds of forms—clear, tacit or the 
combination of the two. Because the clear collusion is 
usually prohibited by the antitrust law, the collusion in 
reality often appears in tacit form. The tacit collusion in 
market behavior enables firms to get excessive profits. 
A lot of papers are about tacit collusion, e.g. Lu (2013), 
Liu and Lai (2014). Oligopolistic industry is generally 
considered involved with tacit collusion, the evidence 
of tacit collusion can be often found out in the existing 
empirical study on oligopolistic firms which produce the 
product of the same quality.
There are many studies on tacit  collusion of 
differentiated products, Chang (1991) studied the relation 
between the degree of differentiation and firms’ ability to 
maintain collusion and found that collusive price is more 
likely to occur in differentiated product industry. Chang 
(1992) allowed firms to redesign products over time. He 
believed that this assumption reinforced Chang’s result 
(1991) that the more substitutable their products are, 
the more difficult collusion occurs because the profits 
from deviation from the collusion are greater when the 
product is more sustainable. Hackner (1995) believed that 
differentiation is in favor of weakening competition as 
well as maintaining collusion. Ross (1992) also proved 
that differentiation is more conducive to collusion in 
the space model. While Hacker (1995) thought that the 
more similar the product is, the more easily to maintain 
collusion in vertical differentiation. However ，under the 
same differentiation (horizontal or vertical),the industry 
competition type has short-term strategic effects on the 
stability of firm’s collusion. Deneckere (1983), Rothschild 
(1992), and Albak and Lambertini (1998) studied the case 
of horizontal product differentiation, which proved that the 
collusion was easier to maintain in the price competitive 
game than in the quality competitive game when the 
substitutability is higher among products, otherwise, it is 
the opposite. While Majerus (1988) thought the result is 
not absolutely true when the number of firms increased. 
Lambertini (2000) thought that firms always prefer 
Cournot quantity competition as well as provide the non-
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cooperative quality under the framework of vertical 
differentiation and in the price and quantity competition. 
Collie David (2006) considered that  Cournot duopoly is 
easier to maintain collusion  than Bertrand duopoly for 
any degree of products substitution if the marginal cost of 
output was increasing. 
All these above analysis on the stability of collusion 
were more focused on the same cost structure under the 
same product differentiation while less on different cost 
structure under different product differentiation. While 
in the real economy, different cost structures apply to 
different economic environment or different industry 
analysis, which has direct effects on collusion and the 
profits from deviation from collusion, and also have 
crucial effects on the stability of collusion. This paper 
revises some viewpoints about the stability of collusion 
under the single cost structure by comparing the stability 
of collusion under Cournot competition and Bertrand 
competition under fixed cost structure and flexible cost 
structure, and comes to some effective conclusions. 
So the basic models are made in part 1, and the cost 
structure includes the fixed cost or changeable cost, and 
the equilibriums of the profit, price, quality, consumers’ 
surplus and welfare are analyzed detailed. The further 
consideration of different cost structure is showed 
in part 2.
1.  BASIC MODELS
Assumed that there was a vertical differentiation 
duopoly market and there were many consumers whose 
preferences variable θ uniformly vary from 0 to 1 
according to their own preferences. Consumers have the 
unit demand for products, we define consumers’ utility 













































 according to Mussa and 
Rosen (1978). Assuming that two firms sell the same 
products but have some differences on the quality they 
offer. Firms compete at the same time under the model 
of two-stage. They compete in quality on the first stage 
and compete in quantity (Cournot competition) or in price 
(Bertrand competition) on the second stage. In which, 
these consumers have the same preference in the same 
quality products, the marginal consumers are indifferent 
to buy another one product or not. When the market is not 
completely covered and consumers’ demand is divided in two 
equilibrium. The one is













































, another one is














































Then all the other ones do not buy any product when their 
preferences belong to [0,θl]. These consumers purchase 
the product from the firm h when their preferences belong 
to [θhl,1], while those consumers purchasethe  product 
from the firm l when their preferences belong to [θl,θhl], 
so the demand of firm h is qh=1-θhl,the demand of firm l 
is  ql=θhl-θl. We use 













































 to represent quantity difference. 
In this article, these subscript letters C, B are under the 
assumption under Cournot competition and Bertrand 
competition, the superscript letter C is under the collusion 
assumption.
1.1  Fixed Cost (














































According to the analysis of  Motta (1993) ,we assume 
that firms’  fixed cost  function is 














































represents fixed cost convexity in product quality. The 
bigger n  it is, the greater the degree of convexity it is and 
the less fixed cost payed for the improvement of one unit 
quality. Generally speaking, the improvement of quality 
needs the cost of research and development, staff training 
etc., that is the fixed cost .As to the kind of knowledge-
intensive, technology-intensive industries (such as 
information industry), the fixed cost and marginal cost of 
the production are both lower while the knowledge fixed 
cost (research and development cost) will be much higher, 
thus the average cost tends to decline. In extreme cases, 
cost of producing products (such as software products) is 
totally composed of knowledge cost and there  is no need 
of any change of input factors in the process of increasing 
products (copying or downloading by the internet). So 
we can assume the marginal cost of production is zero. 
The size of n reflects the increasing degree of fixed cost 
paid for the quality improvement from another point 
of view. Under Cournot competition assumption, we 
can get the price equilibrium as follows from reverse 
deduction:
        ph=sh(1-qh)-slql，pl=sl(1-qh-ql). (1)
Under Bertrand competition assumption, we can get 
the quality equilibrium as follows.
    















































Nash equilibrium: the sub-game perfect Nash 
equilibrium can be obtained through reverse deduction 
methods. Under the assumption of Cournot competition, 
the profits functions of firms on the second stage are as 
follows.
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The quantity optimal recreation functions of maximum 
profits are 
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We can figure the quality functions out from (4) 
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The quantity equilibriums are the reaction functions of 
all quality in market .Therefore the payment functions are 
also functions of all kinds of quality in the market. The 
profits functions of two firms are as follows.
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The first-order conditions of maximum profits function 
on the first stage are as follows.
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When n is different, the Nash-equilibrium in quality of 
high firm and low firm can be seen from Table 11.
Under the assumption of Bertrand competition, we 
put (2) into the profit function (
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) of firm i, 
we can get the price optimal reaction function under first-
order condition as follows.
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We can figure out 
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The profits function of two enterprises can be 
expressed as follows.
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We can get the derivation of sh、sl as follows:
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When n is different, the quality equilibrium can be 
seen in Table 1.
Collusion equilibrium: We assume that  the two firms 
collude tacitly, the two firms can be seen as a monopolist 
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, under the assumption 
of Cournot competition, we put (1) into ΠC and get the 
derivation of qh、ql as follows.
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Solve the Equation (12), and we can get 
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Under the assumption of Bertrand, we put (2) into 
ΠCand get t e derivation of qh, ql as follows.
1 The exact number can be figured out by Mathematica, the same below.
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. So the equilibrium results are the same 
under Bertrand competition and Cournot competition .The 
reason is simple ,the monopolist’s strategies of the price 
competition and quantity competition are the same for any 
given quality combination in order to maximize profits. 
That is to say, no matter what degree of the convexity 
of fixed cost it is, the two firms will choose to produce 
high quality products uniformly and the amount of the 
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When n is different, the equilibrium choices of quality 
can be seen in table 1.Due to the low-quality products are 
no longer be produced under collusion, low-quality firm 
will agree on tacit collusion behavior on the condition that 
it get the corresponding profit and the profits of two firms’ 
tacit collusion according to the profits distribution of 
Albak and Lambertini (1998) can be defined as follows:
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Deviation from collusion: Because firms collude in 
quantity or price, the low-quality firm stick to colluding 
on quantity or price while high-quality firm deviate from 
collusion; or high-quality firms stick to colluding on 
quantity or price while low-quality firm deviate from 
colluding on quantity or price. In the case that high-
quality firm deviate from collusion, the high-quality firm 
no longer share profits with low-quality firm and get all 
the benefit gained from deviating from collusion while 
low-quality firm get profit of zero. In collusion, because 
low-quality firm has already not chosen to produce any 
product in the first stage, then in any cases that deviation 
from collusion will only lead to the profit is zero. So low-
quality firm will always choose to collude.
Conditions of collusion: The game phase of the two-
firm collusion can be repeated indefinitely. The two firms 
maximize their own profits under the same discount 
factor ρ, according to Friedman (1971), the maximized 
joint profits can be maintained through the Nash trigger 
strategy, and form the sub-game perfect equilibrium. The 
Nash trigger strategy is that if any participant deviate 
from cooperation, then the other participants will give up 
on collusion forever, that is to say, the other ones will turn 
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to use static equilibrium strategy to punish the deviator. 
If the discounted value of the profit (πC) from collusion 
is greater than the discount of profit (πD) from deviation 
from collusion and the Nash equilibrium profit (πN), it 
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, then the collusion 
behavior of  maximized joint profit  can be maintained. 
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 (17) 
The critical value in the fixed cost can be seen in 
Table 1; we can draw out following conclusions from
Table 1, 
Table 1








The critical value of 
collusion (cournot 
competition)
The critical value of 
collusion (bertrand 
competition)
λC SNhC SNlC SCh SCl λB SNhB SNlB ρhC ρlC ρhB ρlB
2 2.7924 0.0902 0.2519 0.2500 0 5.2512 0.2533 0.0482 0.6160 0 0.6121 0
3 1.2060 0.3178 0.3832 0.4083 0 2.8660 0.4187 0.1461 0.6771 0 0.6215 0
5 1.1231 0.5050 0.5672 0.5623 0 2.0838 0.5770 0.2769 0.7572 0 0.6136 0
10 1.0439 0.6895 0.7198 0.7169 0 1.7793 0.7287 0.4096 0.8265 0 0.6015 0
15 1.0266 0.7660 0.7864 0.7843 0 1.7520 0.7931 0.4527 0.8507 0 0.5999 0
20 1.0191 0.8097 0.8251 0.8235 0 1.7501 0.8289 0.4736 0.8629 0 0.6000 0
30 1.0122 0.8590 0.8694 0.8683 0 - 0.8694 - 0.8752 0 - -
40 1.0089 0.8866 0.8946 0.8937 0 - 0.8946 - 0.8814 0 - -
50 1.0071 0.9045 0.9109 0.9103 0 - 0.9109 - 0.8852 0 - -
60 1.0058 0.9172 0.9225 0.9221 0 - 0.9225 - 0.8876 0 - -
80 1.0043 0.9342 0.9382 0.9378 0 - 0.9382 - 0.8907 0 - -
100 1.0035 0.9450 0.9482 0.9479 0 - 0.9482 - 0.8925 0 - -
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,  i) the 
competition among firms will be more ferocious because 
of Bertrand price competition ,in order to reduce price 
competition , firms will always choose the greater quality 
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n≥30 There is only one firm which exists in market 
because of the decrease of difference of fixed cost and 
the ferocity of price competition, that is to say, the high-
quality firm produce high-quality products and gain 
monopoly profit.  ii) Because of fierce price competition, 
no matter what n is, the high-quality firm tends to more 
easily to maintain collusion under Bertrand competition 
than the high-quality firms under Cour ot competition. 
iii) As the increase of n, the high-quality firm in Cournot 
competition will be increasingly difficult to maintain 
collusion while the change direction of collusion 
uncertain is uncertain under Cournot competition, and the 
change direction depends on the balanced effect of price 
competition and the effect of reducing cost.
1.2  Changeable Cost (Ci=sni=qi)
As to the labor-intensive and materia  factors-intensive 
industries(traditional industries),the research and 
development cost and fixed cost of production are very 
low while the changeable cost increases fast, thus, we can 
assume the fixed cost is zero. The speed of the increase 
in cost is changeable, and which can be reflected on n.the 
bigger n it is, the higher degree of convexity it is, the 
slower the increase of changeable cost to the improvement 
of quality. Under the structure of changeable cost, the 
profit function of firm is πi=(pi-s
n
i)qi，same with above 
analysis, under Cournot competition ,firms’  profits 
function deviated from the first-order derivative on 
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The quality optimal choice of Nash equilibrium 
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Under Bertrand competition, firms’ profits function 
deviated from the first order derivative on price and the 
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The quality choices of Nash equilibrium change from 
original (12) into
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Same with conclusions from the fixed cost structure, 
no matter firms proceed in price collusion under Bertrand 
competition or proceed in quantity competition under 
Cournot competition; the profit of firms’ collusion is the 
same in equilibrium i.e. 
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The price and quantity can be deviated from the first-
order derivative of collusion profits and we can get 
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Under collusion, the quality choices equilibriums 
are: 
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Thus, under deviation from collusion in Cournot 
competition, the quantity choices and profit  of high-
quality and low-quality firms are as follows:
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Under  devia t ion f rom col lus ion in  Ber t rand 
competition, the quantity choices and profits of high-
quality and low-quality firms are as follows. 
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Solve these Equations (20), (23), (25), we can 
get equilibrium quality choices of different types of 
competition, put equilibrium quality it into (19), (22), 
(26), (27), we can get profits under different types of 
competition, and figure critical value of collusion under 
different types of competition. The equilibrium quality 
choices and collusion critical values can be seen from 
Table 2. We can come to conclusion 2 from Table 2.
Conclusion 2: Under changeable cost Ci=s
n
iqi,  i) 
For any form of competition, the quality difference of 
enterprises in equilibrium will become smaller with the 
increase of n. ii)  CB Cλ λ λ 
 CB Cλ λ λ 




B Cλ λ λ 
 CB Cλ λ λ 
 D ClC lCπ π
(n∈{10,100}). i.e. Same with the structure of fixed cost, 
under Bertrand competition, firms will always choose 
the maximum quality difference in order to release price 
competition. But when the cost increase more faster 
with the improvement of quality, the quality difference 
is bigger in collusion under Bertrand than that under 
Cournot competition, when it is slower, the result is 
opposite. iii) Same with the former conclusions about 
vertical differentiation, for any form of competition, low-
quality firm  prefer to the stability of collusion. iv) For 
any n, the high-quality firm’s collusion stability is always 
higher than that under Cournot competition, while the 




B Cλ λ λ 
 CB Cλ λ λ 
 D ClC lCπ π , low- quality firm will never deviate 
from collusion. v) As n increases, It is more difficult to 
maintain collusion both under Cournot competition and 
under Bertrand competition, while low-quality firm under 
Bertrand competition prefers to maintain collusion. 
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Table 2 
The Quality Choices Equilibrium and Collusion Stability in Different Types of Competition and Collusion 













λC SNhC SNlC λC SCh SCl λB SNhB SNlB ρhC ρlC ρhB ρlB
2 1.2602 0.369 0.2928 2.0000 0.4000 0.2000 2.0547 0.4097 0.1994 0.6680 0 0.6133 0.5479
3 1.1474 0.4756 0.4145 1.5618 0.5032 0.3222 1.7695 0.5158 0.2915 0.6834 0 0.6430 0.5649
5 1.0787 0.5975 0.5539 1.2976 0.6187 0.4768 1.5728 0.6296 0.4003 0.6968 0 0.6782 0.5788
10 1.2952 0.9512 0.7344 1.1363 0.7459 0.6564 1.5020 0.7483 0.4982 0.9873 0 0.7109 0.5495
15 1.2113 0.9647 0.7964 1.0885 0.8042 0.7388 1.5660 0.8021 0.5122 0.9922 0 0.7160 0.4845
20 1.1672 0.9722 0.8329 1.0654 0.8387 0.7872 1.6161 0.8355 0.517 0.9942 0 0.7177 0.4423
30 1.1207 0.9804 0.8748 1.0430 0.8786 0.8424 1.6644 0.8755 0.526 0.9960 0 0.7199 0.4025
40 1.0958 0.9848 0.8987 1.0321 0.9016 0.8736 1.6871 0.8989 0.5328 0.9963 0 0.7211 0.3841
50 1.0802 0.9876 0.9143 1.0255 0.9166 0.8938 1.7001 0.9143 0.5378 0.9972 0 0.7220 0.3735
60 1.0692 0.9895 0.9255 1.0213 0.9274 0.9081 1.7088 0.9253 0.5415 0.9971 0 0.7225 0.3665
80 1.0549 0.9920 0.9404 1.0159 0.9418 0.9271 1.7195 0.9402 0.5468 0.9989 0 0.7232 0.3579
100 1.0458 0.9935 0.9500 1.0127 0.9511 0.9392 1.7257 0.9498 0.5504 0.9982 0 0.7238 0.3518
CONCLUSION
Different cost structures apply to the analysis of different 
industries. Under only the presence of fixed cost, when 
n is different, on the one hand it reflects the industry 
features of knowledge-intensive, technology-intensive 
industry, and on the other hand it reflects the degree 
of difficulty of research and development. Under only 
the presence of changeable cost, While it reflects the 
technological difference of labor-intensive, material-
intensive firm etc. Under fixed cost and changeable cost 
structure, the high-quality firm is always more difficult 
to maintain collusion than the low-quality firm in vertical 
differentiation. With the increase of n , the quality 
difference will get smaller and smaller, the high-quality 
becomes more and more difficult to maintain collusion. 
In equilibrium, price competition is fiercer, firms aim to 
release price competition under Bertrand competition, and 
so the quality difference will be bigger.
Of course, there exist both fixed cost and changeable 
cost in most industries. The cost condition we analyzed is 
only a kind of simplified analysis of different industries, 
which reflects the cost difference of quality promotion. 
Moreover, in this paper, we analyzed collusion stability 
only considering the two factors of types of competition 
and cost structure. In reality, in addition to the two factors, 
the factors also involve the number of competitors, 
the symmetry of market share, entry barriers, frequent 
interactions, transparency of the market, business cycles 
and demand fluctuant and many other factors, the 
consideration of these factors provide the further research 
direction this article.
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